Journal of State and Society

An Unequal Treaty Reminiscent of the Colonial Era

JSS Guest Column — Wed, 18 Feb 2026 05:19:48 +0000

Prabhat Patnaik

THE Indo-US Trade Agreement, even leaving aside specific provisions, has two unusual features that mark it out as an Unequal Treaty, of the sort that imperial powers used to impose on countries of the global south that they did not directly rule. The first is the stipulation that, leaving aside commodities excluded altogether from the purview of the agreement, while the U.S. would impose 18 percent import duty on Indian goods, India would impose, according to Donald Trump’s rough description, zero import duty on American goods. To have an agreement that officially institutionalizes such a difference in tariff rates is most bizarre. It amounts to the US adopting a “beggar-thy-neighbour” policy where the “neighbour” who is being reduced to the status of a “beggar” actually signs an agreement consenting to being reduced to such a status. The second unusual feature is the stipulation that India must buy at least $100 billion of American goods every year for the next five years. A Trade Agreement providing the minimum amount of goods that one country must buy from another, come what may, flies in the face of the entire free market ideology so beloved of the bourgeoisie. The actual amounts traded according to this ideology must depend upon the choices of the buyers; they cannot be dictated by governments and hence cannot be decisions of governments. To have this amount incorporated in an Agreement is therefore utterly bizarre; even more bizarre is the fact that this minimum amount is stipulated for only one country that is a party to the agreement but not the other, which clearly amounts therefore to an Unequal Treaty.

Such an Unequal Treaty can only be imposed by one country upon another. The BJP-led government, no matter what it pretends, has been arm-twisted by the US into signing this Agreement. This then becomes the first time in the history of post-independence India that the government of our free country has behaved in so craven a manner as to sign an Unequal Treaty that is reminiscent of colonial times.

The two most obvious implications of this Unequal Treaty are, first, with regard to the purchase of Russian oil, and second, with regard to the agricultural sector. The question that immediately arises is: how does the BJP-led government ensure that imports from the US are raised from around $40 billion now, to at least $100 billion in the coming year? The government cannot obviously be hoping that imports of all kinds of goods and services from the US would suddenly more than double in just a few months, even if tariffs are reduced to zero; it must therefore be banking on a reduction in Russian oil imports and its substitution by American oil, for that is something it can actually bring about. This not only amounts to acceding to what the Americans have been demanding for some time, but would raise our oil import bill and give a push to inflationary pressures. This is because American oil is at least about 20 percent more expensive than Russian oil.

On average about one-third of India’s total oil imports comes from Russia; this of course was before the government started cutting down on such imports in recent months, but such cutting down itself was a prelude to the Trade Agreement, so that its effect should be counted not separately but along with that of the Trade Agreement. Now, taking our total oil imports to be around $120 billion, the switch from Russian to American oil, would thus add about $ 8 billion to our oil import bill. This is just one element of the colonial-style “drain” that the US is imposing on India through the new Trade Agreement. This “drain” would not be coming out of the pockets of Indian oil companies; they would just “pass it on” to the buyers through higher prices of downstream goods. This means an inflationary push to the economy whose real victims would be the working people since they do not have their money incomes indexed to prices. The shift from Russian to American oil therefore is not just a matter of international diplomacy; it is also a very important class question.

As regards the agricultural sector, the government claims that since some important grains like rice and wheat have been kept out of the purview of the Agreement, agriculture will not suffer because of it. But very significant segments of the sector itself or downstream activities, have been opened up, as the Commerce Minister himself has admitted, though not publicly. Notable instances are apple, cotton, tree nuts, fresh and processed fruit, soybean oil, and wine and spirits. Besides, animal feeds like DDGs and red sorghum have been opened up which would place American companies in a virtual monopoly position in the Indian market. States such as Jammu and Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh, Maharashtra and Gujarat will be particularly adversely affected.

It would no doubt be argued that there is a shortage of animal feed in the country and that larger imports would be beneficial; but acquiring requisite imports to overcome shortage is very different from opening up the entire market for such imports at zero tariffs. Likewise, the Commerce Minister’s claim that dairy products are left out of this particular Agreement, is of little consolation in view of the fact that they figure in the Free Trade Agreements signed recently with the European Union, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom.

In fact, it is noteworthy that the Trump Administration is talking about the incomes of American farmers rising by billions of dollars because of this Agreement, even as the Indian government is denying any adverse consequences for Indian agriculture. If American farmers are going to obtain a larger market in India, then it necessarily follows that Indian farmers must be getting squeezed out of the market; the only exception can be the case of fresh-credit-financed purchase of some agricultural products used as inputs like animal feed, but they can only be a fraction of the total increase in American farm exports to India in consequence of this Agreement.

Here again we have an echo of the colonial era. The peasants and agricultural labourers then had been the worst victims of colonial encroachment into the economy, which is why the one slogan above all, inscribed on the banner of the anti-colonial struggle, had been that they would never have to face such a fate in independent India. Exactly the same hardship however is being visited upon them once again in complete betrayal of the promise of the freedom struggle, and, not surprisingly, by a government led by a party that had nothing whatsoever to do with the freedom struggle.

Critical commentaries on the Indo-US Trade Agreement tend typically to put the blame for it exclusively on the Modi government; but this is superficial. Governments, including fascistic ones, act in the interests of particular classes; and it is significant that the news of the Agreement being finalized had enthused the Indian stock market greatly. The Indian big bourgeoisie and the upper segment of the salariat and professionals want such a tying up with the US even at the expense of the working people of the country. The Indian big bourgeoisie’s quest to go global gets a fillip with the availability of the American market, albeit with 18 percent tariffs; likewise, the upper salariat and professionals’ desire to have their children settled in the US, which had received a setback because of Trump’s animosity, can now have a greater chance of fulfilment. The fracturing of the anti-colonial class alliance, with the big bourgeoisie and the upper segment of the salariat and professionals willing to sacrifice the interests of the working people to further their own interests, is what underlies this capitulation to imperialism.

This fracturing however began even before the BJP-led government came on the scene; in fact, the adoption of the neo-liberal strategy itself was an expression of this fracturing. Here as in other economic matters, in other words, the government led by the fascistic forces carries forward with a ruthless disregard for the working people, a tendency started earlier with the adoption of neo-liberalism.

The Modi government’s capitulation before US imperialism stands in sharp contrast to the attitude of an earlier Prime Minister, albeit presiding over a bourgeois-led regime, whose rejection of American pressure had been so resolute that an American President had confessed to being afraid of looking her in the eye. The difference between the two situations lies in the fact that she had been the Prime Minister of a dirigiste economic regime, which had emerged from the anti-colonial struggle, and, notwithstanding the bourgeois development it was ushering in, had not been oblivious of the interests of the working people.

briCs+, and Changing Geopolitics in the Twenty-First Century*

JSS Guest Column — Wed, 18 Feb 2026 04:52:26 +0000

Ravi Arvind Palat

[T]he day when the cosy club of the rich—the United States, the strongest economies of Western Europe, and Japan—sets the pace for the rest of the world, passing out instructions and assigning grades, is fast drawing to a close (French 2005).

In 2023, two Bloomberg correspondents wondered how the “BRICS group of emergent market nations—Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa—has gone from a slogan dreamt up at an investment bank two decades ago to a real-world club that controls a multilateral lender” when the group was about to add four new members (Hancock & Cohen 2023). This was astonishing because when Jim O’Neill (2001) of Goldman Sachs coined the acronym BRIC—South Africa was not in the original formulation—his purpose was to advocate the inclusion of these large economies, particularly China and India, in the management of global economic policies. He envisioned their inclusion in G7 (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the U.K., and the U.S), perhaps at the expense of the smaller economies (Canada and Italy) for the better coordination of economic policies, especially since major disruptions to the world-economy like the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-98 and the Russian crisis of 1998 had emerged from outside the bloc of high-income states.

Crucially, O’Neill’s projection of the economic growth rates of large economies did not assess the impact that the economic and demographic weight of states like China and India, would have on other economies: on their working and middle classes, on their firms, and on their domestic politics. It also did not consider how economic linkages between states in the Global South would be transformed by the BRICs—their needs for strategic raw materials and markets. Nor did it take into account how the rise of BRIC economies would challenge the technological prowess of North Atlantic states. O’Neill also did not factor in his analysis the consequences of economies that do not share the institutions, practices, and legacies of a Western culture and are from a very different cultural and ethnic formation.

In hindsight, the financial crisis of 2007-08 was a watershed as the crisis was largely limited to the North Atlantic and provided the backdrop for leaders of Brazil, China, India, and Russia to create BRIC at their summit in Yekaterinburg in June 2009. They called for the greater representation for the Global South in the management of economic affairs, the creation of a development bank more attuned to the needs of the South, the growth of South-South trade and even the replacement of the dollar as reserve currency. Consistent with their advocacy of the role of countries in the Global South, they included South Africa at their gathering in Sanya, China in 2011 to constitute the BRICS by adding a member from Africa even if Pretoria did not fully meet the criteria laid out by O’Neill (Tsheola 2014).

As the world-economy recovered from the financial crisis, BRICS did not at first attract much attention especially since the collapse of commodity prices in the mid 2010s plunged Brazil and Russia into recession. China’s double-digit growth rate also fell back to 7 percent and after Goldman Sachs’ BRIC fund suffered significant losses, it was folded it into a general emerging markets fund in 2015 (Hopewell 2017: 1377). Immanuel Wallerstein (2016) even called the group “a fable for our time” for these reasons. Commentators coined several other acronyms to suggest a variety of alternate acronyms for rising economies: O’Neill came up with MINT (Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, Turkey), while others suggested CIVETS (Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey, and South Africa), or VISTA (Vietnam, Indonesia, South Africa, Turkey, and Argentina) (Cooper 2016: 4; Boesler 2013 ; Wallerstein 2016). Even O’Neill (2021), twenty years after he first coined the BRIC acronym was himself disappointed by the glacially slow pace of change in the institutions of global economic governance and with the lackluster growth of some of these economies.

And yet, of the various acronyms proposed for emerging market economies, BRICS was the only one to transform itself from a descriptive acronym to an institutional basis. Apart from the annual summits of its heads of government, the group created financial and other institutions which led to its expansion beyond the quinumvirate to now number 10 members and the BRICS states are the only ones to withstand President Donald Trump’s threats to raise tariffs unless they succumbed to his demands. If much of this was due to the rise of China and to the loss of moral and intellectual leadership by the West, as we shall see, there are still deep divisions within the briCs+, especially between China and India, that may hamper cooperation between them.

When O’Neill formulated the term, the BRIC states were so heterogenous that there was no suggestion that they could institute themselves as a bloc. Each of the four countries was aligned to the United States in some way, though none of them were Washington’s protectorates like the other G7 states: all four were too large to be clients. Russia had been included in the annual G7 heads of government meetings in 1998 partly to soften the blow for the expansion of NATO to Eastern Europe in 1999 and 2004, an expansion that violated Washington’s earlier commitment not to expand the alliance “by one inch” at the demise of the Soviet Union (Sarotte 2021).[1] In a bid to keep prices of its manufactured exports low, China had become by 2006, the largest holder of U.S. Treasuries. Given the long-standing territorial dispute between China and India, the United States had been consistently trying to wean New Delhi from its non-aligned posture, and in 2007, succeeded in coopting India as a member of the Quad security arrangement along with Australia, Japan, and the U.S: essentially to a watered-down Asian NATO against China because it doesn’t obligate allies to respond if one member is attacked. Similarly, Washington had recruited Brazil for peacekeeping missions in the early 2000s in Haiti and designated South Africa as the lead state in dealings with Zimbabwe (Palat 2008: 722-23, 730-31; Palat 2012 ; de Carvalho, Anand, & Naidu 2025: 13, 23, 26; Tellis 2025). These ties to Washington led some like Patrick Bond (2013) to call BRICS “sub-imperialist” powers.

Yet, the following year, on the heels of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and Moscow’s consequent expulsion from the G8, BRICS at their Fortaleza summit in 2014, created a multinational bank, the New Development Bank (NDB) and a financial reserve arrangement, the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA), broadly similar to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) respectively. NDB is headquartered in Shanghai with an initial capitalization of $50 million, shared equally by the five member states (Cooper 2016: 65). It expanded with the inclusion of Bangladesh and the United Arab Emirates in 2021, Egypt in 2023, and Algeria in 2025.[2] The CRA had an initial capitalization of $100 billion—$41 billion from China, $18 billion each from Brazil, India, and Russia, and $5 billion from South Africa (Cooper 2016: 65-66; de Carvalho, Anand, & Naidu 2025:20). And unlike the acronyms describing other emerging market economies, BRICS as a group was able to add several other members in 2024: Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, and the United Arab Emirates. The organization now called itself briCs+ and accounted for 29% of global GDP, 46% of world population, 25% of all exports, and 43% of oil production (Pertry & Nölke 2024: 3). In 2025, Indonesia also joined the group. Ten other states—Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Uganda, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam—were accorded partner status in 2024 giving the bloc a broader Global South patina. Saudi Arabia participates in BRICS forums but has yet to formally join the group. Argentina is the only country, under its right-wing president, Javier Milei, that refused an offer of membership (Rodrigues Vieira 2025: 125-26)!

The success of briCs+ is underpinned by China—it was not only the second largest economy in the world in nominal terms, but its economy is also larger than those of the other nine briCs+ economies combined (Hopewell 2017: 1380). The recovery of the global economy from the financial crisis of 2007-08 owed much to China’s gargantuan investments in infrastructure: to take just one instance, according to the U.S. Geological Survey, in just three years between 2011 and 2013, China used 40% more cement than the United States did in the entire twentieth century (Palat 2024: 146-47). Additionally, actions of Western states, especially by the United States, has alienated much of the Global South, and briCs+ provides an umbrella for China to expand its global presence.

Source: https://www.visualcapitalist.com/ranked-global-share-of-manufacturing-value-by-country/

The World Bank estimated that China accounted for 26 percent of the world’s manufactured products, more than the combined total of the next three largest economies—the United States, Germany, and India. China’s scale of exports, and its import of raw materials for these has made it a larger trading partner than the United States for 70 percent, or 145 of 205 of the world’s economies by 2023 according to Australia’s Lowy Institute (Rajah & Albayrak 2025). Since the Lowy Institute report was published in January 2025, China overtook the United States as Germany’s top trading partner in the first eight months of 2025 partly because of the tariffs imposed on German exports by the second Trump administration (Wagner & Martinez 2025).

Source: https://www.visualcapitalist.com/cp/how-china-overtook-u-s-in-global-trade-dominance-2000-2024/

The expanding scale and sophistication of China’s manufacturing also led it to finance infrastructural projects in many states of the Global South to extract raw materials. Both the NDB and the China-led Asian Investment and Infrastructure Bank (AIIB) made loans without the “conditionalities” attached to World Bank and IMF loans (Pertry & Nölke 2024: 60). These financial institutions were deliberately set up to counter U.S., European, and Japanese domination of the international financial institutions—especially the World Bank and the IMF—set up by the Bretton Woods agreement, and despite Washington’s opposition, all G-7 economies except the U.S. and Japan, as well as other close American allies joined the AIIB which was inaugurated in January 2016 (Wu 2017).[1]

During the Covid-19 pandemic, the United States suffered a striking loss of moral and intellectual leadership as it used monetary incentives to divert to its shores personal protective equipment paid for by France, buy exclusive rights to a vaccine developed by a company funded by the German government, and to even hijack medical supplies from its own domestic state governments (Willsher, Holmes, McKernan, & Tondo 2020 ; Jankowicz 2020 ; Palat 2022: 35; Economist 2025c). In contrast, though the vaccines produced by China, India, and Russia were less effective than the mRNA vaccines produced by U.S. and European pharmaceutical companies, they supplied them to many parts of Africa, Asia, and Latin America unlike firms and governments of the global North (Mezzadra & Neilson 2024: 76-77). Chinese biotechs that did not really exist a decade ago have now been propelled to become the second largest developer of new drugs (Economist 2025a ; Temple-West 2025 ; Olcott, Ko, & Sandlund 2025)

In this context, though the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 may have united the West temporarily, the perception that the West privileged profits over the health of the peoples of the Global South led to a fracture between the West and the Rest according to a poll conducted by Timothy Garton Ash, Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard (2023) for the European Council of Foreign Relations. The rupture was compounded by the West not only shielding Israel from criticism but also by actively assisting its gruesome genocide in Gaza since October 2023: a gross violation of the supposed rule-based international order. Grotesquely, Nicolas Guillou, a French judge on the International Criminal Court that approved the arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, and Hamas military wing chief, Mohammed Deif found that he could not shop online or book hotel rooms in France because he was sanctioned by the United States and hence could not use his bank cards (Jones 2025).[2]

The weaponization of the dollar as illustrated by the sanctions imposed on Iran, Russia, and Venezuela among others—and secondary sanctions, or sanctions imposed on third countries by the United States if they continue to deal with sanctioned countries, firms, or individuals—further accelerated a move towards de-dollarization through mutual currency arrangements between countries and towards the internationalization of the Chinese renminbi (RMB). Since foreigners would accept and use RMB as payment only if they had access to it, China had to create a large reservoir of currency outside the Peoples’ Republic. Several countries have even swapped out their debts in dollars to RMB (Cotterill, Murray, & Daniels 2025 ; Sandlund & Ko 2025). “Paradoxically then, de-dollarization opens China’s financial system to greater foreign investment, including from the US. What counts as decoupling in one arena drives integration in another” (Mezzadra & Neilson 2024: 189).

China, consequently, has emerged as a major lender. AidData’s exhaustive analysis of Chinese lending patterns shows that between 2000 and 2023, Chinese banks loaned $2.2 trillion, half of which were directed towards high-income states and that the United States was the single largest recipient with $200 billion. Beijing directed its resources to its advantage in strategic sectors to control supply chains. These included loans for massive infrastructural projects—railway projects in Central Asia, highway networks in Africa, ports in Latin America—as part of President Xi Jingping’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (Stevenson 2025 ; Hindu Data Team 2025).[3] BRI also provides Beijing with an avenue to sell its goods and even set up agencies to evade tariffs imposed on imports from China. In recent years, much of this lending has been in RMB as China seeks to reduce its dependence on the dollar: the Bank of International Settlements estimated that in the four years ending on 31 March 2025, Beijing’s lending in RMB to low- and middle-income countries rose by $373 billion (Sandlund & Ko 2025). Better terms of trade, investment, and aid—and loan forgiveness—from China also forces intensifies pressure on financial institutions in the Global North to offer low-income nations better terms (Arrighi & Zhang 2011: 49). Strikingly, when President Trump was imposing tariffs across the board, China announced that it was dropping all tariffs on imports from 53 African states (Zane 2025).

Source: (Hindu Data Team 2025).

Unsurprisingly, given the exclusion of many of its banks from the Belgium-based Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT), Russia has taken the lead in de-dollarization and the greenback component of Sino-Russian trade dropped fell from 90% in 2015 to 20% in 2023. Russia also issued its first RMB bond in December 2025, joining Slovenia and Kazakhstan (Cotterill 2025 ; Sandlund & Ko 2025). BRICS are also working on a BRICS PAY system that will be an alternate to SWIFT which is after all increasingly outdated by blockchain technologies and the emergence of central bank digital currencies—and this of course would be especially welcome to countries and firms subject to U.S. sanctions and secondary sanctions like Iran, Russia, and Venezuela. In 2023, a larger percentage of China’s international trade was settled in RMB than in dollars for the first time (Pertry & Nölke 2024: 17; Xie 2025: 78).

President Trump has also torpedoed more than two decades of U.S, efforts to court India as an ally against China for what appears to be petty and egoistical reasons—Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s refusal to give him credit for ending a military clash between New Delhi and Islamabad and Modi’s refusal to endorse Trump’s nomination for a Nobel Peace Prize—by imposing a tariff of 50% on imports from India, besides deporting thousands of Indian nationals. The ostensible reason for imposing this impossibly high tariff was to eliminate India’s purchase of Russian oil in an attempt to force Russia to the negotiating table over the conflict in Ukraine. China is a larger purchaser of Russian oil than India but since it controlled about 90 percent of the processing of rare earths vital for most consumer and military goods, Trump had to backtrack on tariffs on China.[1] Interestingly,

A distinct feature of the Russian war effort derived from the predominantly extractive form of capitalism that has evolved in that country: the need to keep selling energy to its enemies in order to fund its military campaign” (Mezzadra & Neilson 2024: 17).

Nevertheless, Modi could not accede to this demand nor to Trump’s other demand to open up India’s agricultural markets as it would shatter his domestic support and analysts expect India to continue importing Russian oil through less transparent channels (Balakrishnan 2025b).

Contending that former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro’s conviction for attempting a coup was politically motivated, Trump sanctioned a Brazilian Supreme Court judge, cancelled the visas of several Brazilian officials and imposed a 50% tariff on Brazilian imports. But as the U.S. has a trade surplus with Brazil and accounts for only 12 percent of the latter’s exports, Brazil is well positioned to deal with this (Ionova 2025). In fact, as China cut back its imports of agricultural products—especially beef and soy beans—from the U.S., it turned to Brazil. South Africa, the weakest of the BRICS, may be the least prepared for Washington’s sanctions but when Trump ambushed its president, Cyril Ramaphosa, in May 2025, with “false and inflammatory claims about a ‘white genocide’ Afrikaner farmers” (Stuenkel & Gabuev 2025), it had no choice but to oppose Washington.

To recapitulate, O’Neill’s original formulation of BRICs was based on economic projections, advocating integrating these large market economies in global economic governance at the expense of smaller G-7 states. He did not, and perhaps could not, analyze the geo-political and economic consequences of the rise of the BRIC economies. In the first instance, the high rates of economic growth that have pulled hundreds of millions of Chinese, Indians, and others out of poverty and boosted the fortunes of their upper- and middle-classes have had an adverse impact on the middle-classes of the North Atlantic as Branko Milanovic’s (2016 ; 2022 ; see also Corak 2016) “elephant curve” suggests and triggered the rise of protectionist and anti-immigrant movements in the United States and Western Europe. The growth of manufacturing in China, and the consequent need to procure strategic raw materials, has seen a dramatic expansion in its trade relations with African, Asian, and Latin American states. Indeed, the growth of South-South trade has blunted the impact of many of Trump’s tariffs. To facilitate this trade, BRI has led to massive infrastructural development in Africa, Central Asia, and Latin America. China’s growing dominance in clean energy, electronic vehicles, fast trains, rare earths and their processing, and biotechnologies further signify the erosion of the dominance North Atlantic economies have exercised for more than 250 years.

The institutionalization of BRICS has also led to the creation of financial institutions not controlled by high-income states and along with Chinese-led banks like the AIIB, they are a source of finance for low- and middle-income states that do not come attached with “conditionalities.” In the context of the weaponization of the dollar, these channels and the gradual internationalization of the RMB and the introduction of BRICS Pay, and currency-swap arrangements indicate slow moves towards de-dollarization of interstate currency arrangements.

Though each of the BRICS quinumvirate have refused to submit to Trump’s tariffs, they are not yet a coherent actor on the international stage. Most importantly, China and India remain at loggerheads over their territorial disputes and as O’Neill recently noted that unless China and India come together, talk of BRICS ever challenging the dollar is “for the fairies” (see Johnston 2025: 246), because India can’t counter China without Washington’s help. Even as New Delhi has a ‘special and privileged partnership’ with Russia, Moscow’s dependence on Beijing—their “no limits” partnership—for its conflict in Ukraine means it will not be able to provide a counterweight for India. Politically, the Hindu nationalist government of India reversed New Delhi’s long-standing advocacy of the Palestinian cause and now supports Israel while Brazil joined South Africa in its case against Israel in the International Criminal Court. Expansion of the briCs+ also brings other challenges. At their Rio de Janeiro meeting in April 2025, foreign ministers could not agree on a joint communique for the first time—the stumbling block being the issue of the reform of the UN Security Council because Egypt and Ethiopia refused to endorse South Africa’s aspirations for a permanent seat (Stuenkel & Gabuev 2025). However, these challenges may resolve themselves, the relentless growth of China, India, and other economies and their interrelationship indicates that we are at the cusp of a new era of world history, one that is no longer dominated by states of the North Atlantic.

*[1] I use the ‘briCs+’ with an upper-case ‘C’ in the title to underscore the greater economic weight of China and the ‘+’ notation to indicate an expansion of the group membership though the acronym remains unchanged. I am thankful to William G Martin for comments on an earlier draft.

[2] With the inclusion of Russia in the G7 heads of government meeting, it was renamed the G8 but Russia was not included in sessions discussing global economic governance (Rodrigues Vieira 2025: 127).

[3] https://www.ndb.int/about-ndb/members/. By its charter, NDB is open to all UN members but the original quinumvirate will retain at least 55% of the votes. With the addition of new members, the original 5 members each hold 18.98 percent of the shares and the new members less than 3 percent each (de Sá & Garcia 2025: 273; Johnston 2025: 253).

[4] AIIB had 57 founding members, of which 20 were from outside Asia. By 2020, it had 103 members representing 79% of the world population and 65% of global GDP, https://www.aiib.org/en/about-aiib/index.html

[5] I owe this reference to Anne McCall.

[6] Loans for infrastructure under the BRI scheme accounted for 20% of China’s lending (Economist 2025b).

[7] While Russian oil had barely figured in India’s imports before the Ukraine war, it now accounted for between 35 and 50 percent of its imports of crude oil. After refining the oil, India supplied it to other countries and was even the largest supplier of diesel to Ukraine in July 2025 (Patra 2025 ; Reuters 2025 ; Balakrishnan 2025a).

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— (2025b). “India Won’t Blink: Russian Oil Will Still Keep Coming Despite Latest US Sanctions.” Telegraph online, 4 December, (https://www.telegraphindia.com/business/india-wont-blink-russian-oil-will-still-keep-coming-despite-latest-us-sanctions/cid/2135948).

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Ravi Arvind Palat serves as Emeritus Professor at the Department of Sociology, Binghamton University, The State University of New York. He has undertaken research in historical sociology, political economy, nationalism and ethnic conflict, social theory.

Frederic Jameson’s Call ‘Always Historicise’ Will Last

JSS Guest Column — Sat, 28 Sep 2024 04:07:36 +0000

Rajan Gurukkal

Fredric Jameson has become a memory. However, this American literary theorist’s studies, no matter whether they carry mature Hegel or Young Marx. He had entered the field with his 1971 thesis, Marxism and Form: Twentieth Century Dialectical Theories of Literature. Easy to be labelled, very few scholars discussed the work. Nevertheless, Jameson became famed for his book, The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act,the classic that opens with the most widely quoted slogan, ‘Always Historicise’.

Jameson’s theorisation has been an object of engagement for philosophers and cultural theorists with the publication of his 1991 work, Postmodernism or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, which beautifully demonstrates how postmodern thinking obfuscates between the cultural and the real. Jameson believed that the central problem of postmodernism has been a capsized logic emerging out of the crisis of its historicity. He diffuses this crisis across multiple fields such as literature, economics, architecture, philosophy, film, television, and mass media. A literary theorist unfailingly holding on to the concept of historically contingent real, Jameson had been impatient of postmodern dilation of the cultural domain inspiring consumers to celebrate market, legitimise commodification and naturalise commodity fetishism.

Marxism has been central to his historical hermeneutics in literary criticism. However, Jameson had no hesitation to be eclectic in his interpretations of nuances. He has used insights drawn from Spinoza’s necessity of knowledge, Hegel’s phenomenology of the Zeitgeist dialectics, Bergson’s objectivity of time, Nietzsche’s notion of the excluded middle, Heidegger’s philosophy of inseparability between the world and human existence, Lacan’s theory of the unconscious, Foucault’s concept of discourse, Mikhail Bakhtin’s ideologeme, and Deleuze’s vitalist ideas. While emphasising the material basis of class conflicts and revolt in cultural texts, Jameson celebrates the ideology of utopia and liberation as well.

Jameson boldly walked head-aloft all along his four decades of trailblazing academic career making lasting contributions in the field of cultural theory and literary criticism. He will be remembered as a Marxian theorist in literary criticism and cultural analyst in Postmodern Capitalism.

Is Kerala Facing a Health Crisis?

JSS Guest Column — Mon, 15 Jul 2024 04:00:01 +0000

Dr. B. Ekbal, Journal of State and Society, 15 July 2024

In recent years, Kerala, a state renowned for its impressive health indicators, is currently grappling with a rise in infectious diseases. Infectious diseases such as Dengue, Chikungunya, H1N1, diarrheal diseases, Leptospirosis, West Nile virus, Japanese Encephalitis, Scrub Typhus, Leishmaniasis, and Kyasanur Forest Disease have become endemic in the region, claiming many lives annually. Moreover, Kerala has faced outbreaks of Nipah and Zika viruses also. Cholera cases and deaths have also been reported. Furthermore, the incidence of rabies due to stray dog bites is on the rise. Alarmingly, a few individuals have succumbed to brain-affecting amoebiasis, a rare condition that current doctors are only familiar with through medical texts.

The Vicious Circle of Diseases

Kerala is grappling with a double burden of both non-communicable and communicable diseases. Chronic conditions like diabetes, hypertension, cancer, and lung diseases—often described as lifestyle diseases—are on the rise. This creates a vicious cycle, where infectious diseases exacerbate chronic conditions, and chronic conditions, in turn, increase susceptibility to infections. For instance, people with non-communicable diseases face a higher risk of severe illness and death from infectious diseases such as Covid-19. This intertwined relationship intensifies the overall health crisis in the region.

The Need for Coordinated Action

While the public should diligently follow the health department’s guidelines for preventing and controlling infectious diseases, various government departments also need to take proactive measures. A clear and comprehensive action plan must be devised and implemented to address both communicable and non-communicable diseases in Kerala.

Strengthening Disease Prevention Measures

To prevent communicable diseases, it is essential to ensure effective mosquito and pest control, proper sanitation, and access to clean water. If the density of Aedes aegypti mosquitoes remains high, there is a risk of the deadly yellow fever reaching Kerala. Given the rising incidence of vector-borne diseases, the health and local self-government departments must collaborate to implement robust vector control programs. Additionally, tailored public health measures are necessary to control recurring diseases such as Nipah, scrub typhus, black fever, and monkey fever, considering their unique transmission modes. The increase in stray dog populations, largely due to the dumping of food waste in public places, also needs to be addressed with strict measures to prevent this practice.

Addressing Preventable Deaths and Water Safety

Despite the availability of the flu vaccine and antiviral medication, at least fifty deaths from H1N1 occur annually in Kerala, a situation that must be addressed. Encouraging flu vaccination is crucial. Similarly, deaths due to leptospirosis can be prevented through effective rat control and the use of preventive and treatment drugs. Agricultural workers, cattle handlers, and others at risk should wear protective shoes and gloves to safeguard against leptospirosis. Additionally, the well water used by many Keralites is often contaminated with organic matter and Escherichia coli, the bacterium responsible for diarrheal diseases. This contamination is frequently due to faulty toilet construction. A detailed investigation into these construction defects is necessary to develop effective solutions and ensure safe drinking water.

Strengthen Sub-Centres

Kerala has made significant strides in advancing curative care and treatment facilities. As part of the Aardram Mission, primary health centres have been upgraded with special clinics for non-communicable diseases, mental illness, and respiratory diseases, along with the provision of essential medicines. Many of our taluk, district, and government medical college hospitals have developed remarkably in terms of modern technology and human resources, often surpassing private medium or large corporate hospitals and private medical colleges. Consequently, the number of people utilizing government hospital services has increased to 60-70 percent.

But we have not been able to utilize the potential we have at various levels in terms of public health activities aiming the prevention and control of diseases. . The functioning of the lower-level sub-centres for health education and nutrition needs to be further improved. The state government is trying to expand the subcentres into Peoples’ Health Centres, while the central government’s plan for wellness clinics under the name of “Ayushman Arogya Mandir” has been proposed to be implemented at the subcentres. Whatever the name may be, the subcentres should not become adjuncts to the curative care treatment facilities of the primary health centres, but special care should be taken to make them to give more emphasis on disease prevention, health education and health promotion.

Public Health Interventions

In addition to enhancing medical facilities, effective public health interventions are essential to address Kerala’s health crisis. We have not fully leveraged the expertise of public health experts in the Departments of Community Medicine in government and private medical colleges, the Achutha Menon Centre for Health Science Studies, and the Department of Public Health and Community Medicine at Kasaragod Central University. Their skills should be harnessed for conducting detailed studies and implementing public health interventions tailored to Kerala’s unique challenges. Government and private medical colleges, along with public health institutions across districts, should investigate local health issues and provide solutions to the health department and local self-governing bodies. These institutions can also assist local governments in developing and executing public health projects at the community level.

Prevention, Monitoring, and Surveillance
In addition to prevention, effective monitoring and surveillance of diseases are crucial. The existing PEID Cells (Prevention of Epidemic and Infectious Diseases), in the medical colleges which focus on epidemic prevention, need to be made more efficient. The decision to establish a centre in Kerala modelled after the CDC (Centres for Disease Control and Prevention) in the United States, which excels in disease prevention and control, is a welcome move.

The Kerala University of Health Sciences should lead research initiatives to investigate the unique health problems faced by Keralites. The School of Public Health under the University should focus specifically on the state’s public health issues and advise the government on policy-level interventions.

Health Indicators and Infectious Diseases

Based on recognized indicators such as infant mortality rate and life expectancy, Kerala is often considered on par with developed countries in terms of health achievements. However, it is important to note that Kerala still struggles with many infectious diseases that have been eradicated or controlled in developing countries like Cuba, Nicaragua, and Sri Lanka, which perform better in certain health indicators. If we account for the presence of these infectious diseases by giving negative weightage—well-controlled in both developed and some developing countries—Kerala might fall behind in the list of good health achievers compared to many other regions.

Dr Ekbal, a former Vice Chancellor, University of Kerala, is an internationally acclaimed health activist. He had served as professor and head, Department of Neurosurgery, Medical College, Kottayam and officiated as Member, Kerala State Planning Board.

Journal of State and Society, 15 July 2024 ISSN 3048-555X

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The NPF Programme Goes Beyond Neo-Liberalism

JSS Guest Column — Sun, 07 Jul 2024 04:54:08 +0000

Prabhat Patnaik

FOR the French elections which Emmanuel Macron has called in the wake of the impressive showing by the far-right in the European parliamentary polls, four parties on the Left, the Communists, the Socialists, the Greens, and France Unbowed (of Jean-Luc Melenchon), have come together to form a New Popular Front to take on the fascist challenge of Marine Le Pen. This development is of historic significance: the New Popular Front is reminiscent of the Popular Front of the 1930s in France that had been formed against the backdrop of the rise of fascism in Europe, especially of the Nazi take-over of Germany. And while Macron is a straightforward neo-liberal whose poll ratings are very poor at the moment, and the far-right, true to character, is vague on economics and half-heartedly backing big business (before it openly aligns itself with monopoly capital at the “right moment”), the NPF has come out with a clear economic programme. Though the NPF has had to toe the American line on the Ukraine war in order to accommodate the Socialists, and has even made compromises, with regard to Melenchon’s known views, in the position it has taken on the genocide in Gaza, the economic programme it has adopted is clearly opposed to neo-liberalism.

This programme seeks to increase the monthly minimum wage; to impose price ceilings on essential foods, electricity, gas and petrol; to repeal Macron’s decision to raise the retirement age to 64 which would raise the pension commitments of the State; and to make large investments in the green transition and in public services. The NPF has made careful calculations of the cost of implementing this programme and proposes to finance it, without raising the fiscal deficit beyond the limits permitted by the European Community, by taxing the super-profits of companies, by reintroducing the wealth tax which Macron had abolished, by plugging various tax loopholes, and by ensuring that there is a ceiling to the amount that can be inherited, with the excess being taken over by the State.

All this is diametrically opposed to what neo-liberalism has been preaching all these years and all that has been propagated as the truth by the mainstream media, not just in France but over much of the world including India. When a suggestion was made that countries should reach agreement on a minimum 25 per cent corporate tax rate, so that capital does not move from one country to another to take advantage of differential tax rates, most governments, under thraldom to globalised finance, demurred; the agreement finally reached was for a 15 per cent tax rate which was lower than the prevailing corporate tax rate in most countries; in this context the proposal in the NPF’s programme for taxing super-profits acquires special significance.

Likewise, there has been a general tendency to abolish the wealth tax on the grounds that it is difficult to implement and that the revenue obtained from it is less than the cost associated with instituting it. Even in India the wealth tax that had been in place earlier was sought to be abolished on this argument; the wealth tax is implemented lackadaisically to start with and the meagre revenue obtained from it as a consequence is then used as the pretext for abolishing it. The NPF’s programme calls this bluff and seeks to reintroduce the wealth tax.

Of course, other political formations too have suggested a revival of the wealth tax as a significant revenue source in recent years. In the last US presidential elections, two contenders from the Democratic Party, Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren, had come out with proposals for a graded wealth tax; but the American political establishment prevented either from being nominated to take on Donald Trump, so that their proposals remained only at a preliminary stage. Very recently, the team around Thomas Piketty, the French economist associated with the World Inequality Database, has come out with a proposal for India to re-introduce a wealth tax on the super-rich in the backdrop of the massive increase in wealth inequality in the country, a proposal that echoes what the Left in the country has been demanding for long.

Likewise a revamping of the inheritance tax proposed by the NPF is a must in any democratic society; in fact such a tax is perfectly compatible with the philosophy of capitalism that justifies profit as a reward for some special qualities possessed by capitalists, and not as an inheritance handed down from parent to children. Besides, while an inheritance tax can stand on its own, it also constitutes a necessary complement to the wealth tax. And yet when an inheritance tax was suggested recently by a prominent member of the Indian National Congress (the Left has been mooting the idea for a very long time), the entire Indian media not to mention Prime Minister Narendra Modi came down on him like a ton of bricks. The prime minister even gave the proposal an utterly diabolical communal-fascist twist by claiming that the Congress was going to snatch ornaments from Hindu women to hand them over to Muslims! The NPF’s suggestion in fact is not just for an inheritance tax, but for a ceiling on inheritance, which becomes particularly significant in this context.

The same is true of the proposal to increase expenditures on public services. We have seen the deleterious effect of privatising services like education and healthcare in our own country, which is in conformity with the demands of neo-liberal capitalism and which has made them exorbitantly expensive. In fact, one of the major causes for farmers getting into debt which they cannot then repay and often take their own lives because of their inability to repay, is the sudden incurring of healthcare expenditure, the need for which arises out of the blue.

Likewise, the proposal to have price ceilings as the means to insulate people from the impact of inflation, breaks completely from capitalist orthodoxy that exclusively uses the instruments of monetary and fiscal policy. These policy instruments necessarily reduce the level of activity in the economy and hence employment; in fact, the only antidote to inflation under capitalism is the creation of larger unemployment. Price control rather than greater unemployment as the means of combating inflation, though mooted by the Left in India in the past, has now found a place in the programme of a major political formation in a metropolitan economy.

After decades of the rubbish being doled out by the spokesmen of globalised capital, and the claim that there is no alternative to this rubbish (the so-called TINA factor), the programme of the NPF comes as a breath of fresh air. Not surprisingly, the French bourgeois press and a range of politicians, from the adherents of neo-liberalism to the far-right, have come down heavily on the economic programme of the NPF, scaring people with stories that the French economy would be doomed if this programme gets implemented. And yet the NPF, up to now at any rate, is doing well in opinion polls. Against 31 per cent support reported for the far-right, in the opinion polls, the NPF’s share comes to anywhere between 26 and 28 per cent, with Macron’s party trailing with less than 20 per cent.

The very fact that the French Left has managed to put aside its differences to come together to defeat fascism is a welcome sign. The Social Democratic leader Glucksman has set aside his long-standing animosity towards Jean-Luc Melenchon to promise support to the NPF; and Melenchon in turn has promised to stand aside from the prime minister’s post if the alliance partners object to him, in the event of an NPF victory. The setting aside of personal ambitions and even ideological differences within the NPF for keeping the far-right out of power, is quite remarkable.

Even more remarkable from our point of view is the adoption of a common economic programme, defended by all constituents, that is opposed to neo-liberalism and that charts an altogether new and exciting course. Whatever the outcome of the elections, this portends a new beginning in the realm of ideas, especially as it is happening in a metropolitan economy.

@Peoples Democracy

National Education Policy, 2020: A Step Further Back

JSS Guest Column — Tue, 05 Dec 2023 09:00:00 +0000

Rajesh Komath and Lekshmi Prabha Snehalatha

Journal of State and Society – December 2023

The National Education Policy (NEP) 2020, which aims to unify India’s educational systems nationally, has been approved without discussions in the Houses of Parliament. At first glance, it becomes evident that the policy focuses on technical education, employment, and skilled labour. The concept of education solely as a means of livelihood for the masses, aimed at earning a living, reflects a caste notion. It can be understood that the policy is formulated based on Hindu Dharma Sastra, where the Brahmins generate knowledge, the Kshatriyas implement it, the Vyshyas manage the economic base, and the Sudras and Dalits become the workforce, engaging in various forms of manual labour. Consequently, the New Education Policy aims at making the masses the labour force, serving the upper castes.

The policy insists that students who reach grade three should attain foundational literacy and numeracy, choose areas of study and work based on their abilities and interests, enhance their life skills, and foster pride in India. This may be because the modern world is structured on an economic basis and the policy approves of at least this level of education. However, it provides only a minimum education for the poor masses.

The modern education system should be founded on the freedom of the individual. Higher education should be seen as a means to acquire wisdom and develop critical thinking capable of transcending structural inequalities, thereby gradually transforming the exploitative social order. Scholars like Dr. B R Ambedkar were able to positively impact people’s lives because they received transformative education. However, the National Education Policy 2020 appears oblivious to the violence inherent in structural social inequalities. The policy does not make any recommendations to address the issue of school dropouts. It becomes the responsibility of civil societies to reintegrate children who drop out of school. Although the policy suggests the romantic notion of students having the freedom to ‘exit’ and ‘re-enter’ education at any point, it lacks elaboration on practical implementation. The likelihood of students who drop out returning to continue their education is minimal. Additionally, the government aims to withdraw from providing financial assistance for education, shifting this responsibility to voluntary organizations.

The suggestion that political groups or organizations based on caste and religion can support financially challenged students is not innocuous. The underlying logic behind this policy is that such voluntary organizations may influence students, shaping a generation that aligns with the political agendas of these organizations. Consequently, students might become ensnared in the structure of social inequality. This suggestion can be seen as romanticizing the injustice and violence inherent in structural social inequalities.

When general education aligns with the norms set by the Sangh Parivar, educational institutions become modern spaces marked by casteism, akin to agraharas. The provision of fellowships to students by private organizations under the guise of philanthropy contradicts the idea of the government as a welfare state. It represents the State’s abdication of its responsibility. These ‘support systems’ impede the evolution of students into individuals with free will and an independent consciousness. Even in this scenario, the government’s aspirations function as an ideology influencing students. This dynamic is detrimental to the growth of democracy and the developmental sensibilities of a state.

Students guided by moral and political values such as truth, beauty, goodness, peace, and non-violence can inadvertently become stereotypical subjects, refraining from opposing the political power dynamics in the country and the resulting inequalities. This aligns with the Union Government’s ambition to position India as the Global Guru. The policy, which designates a significant portion of the population as manual laborers and reserves higher educational opportunities for the elite, merely offers new interpretations for age-old visions. It essentially romanticizes injustice. The Education Policy seeks to overturn the modern and democratic public policy that India has developed over the years, aiming to transform India into a Hindu Rashtra adhering to Hindu dharma. In essence, the NEP becomes a policy document shaping an India culturally determined by Brahminism, politically influenced by Hindutva, and economically driven by corporate capital.

The policy dismisses the recent advancements that democratic India has provided to individuals from the lower strata of society, potentially relegating lower classes, including Sudras, to mere laborers. Examining the statistics related to becoming the Global Guru under this approach is essential. Currently, 54 per cent of the country’s population is below 25 years of age, with 62 per cent falling between 15 and 59 years. Projections indicate that within the next 15-20 years, the global industrial workforce will decrease to less than four per cent, contrasting with India’s expected rise to 32 per cent. This demographic trend positions India favorably for increased participation in the global economic process. By 2025, the average age of India will be 31, reaching 38 by 2050, making it the most youthful country in terms of average age. This sets a conducive environment for India to achieve economic progress.

However, the policy’s emphasis on educational loans over fellowships, coupled with a shift towards foreign university models, risks limiting educational opportunities to the trivarnikas—Brahmins, Kshatriyas, and Vyshyas. When questioned about the shift from three-year to four-year degree programs, officials cite alignment with foreign universities. This alteration potentially restricts higher education opportunities to financially affluent upper castes, by international educational practices. This approach of becoming Vishwa Guru appears to be an inverted policy, sidelining the youth who have hitherto been educated based on prevailing national educational practices and reserving advanced education opportunities for the financially privileged upper castes, thus deviating from the essence of a truly inclusive educational framework.

The reality is markedly different. The quality of the workforce significantly influences the 32 percent growth projection. Despite having a large workforce in India, the nation lags in terms of the quality and excellence of work. If this trend persists, the expanding workforce may remain unemployable, leading to unemployment and underutilization. To harness the benefits of favourable demographics, it is imperative to transform our youth into an outstanding workforce.

Currently, only 15 percent of the Indian workforce is available for formal training, in contrast to 69 percent in North Korea, 80 percent in the U.S., and 69 percent in England. These statistics suggest diminished opportunities for the Indian workforce to participate in job opportunities arising from global economic growth, as evidenced by the 2022 government statistics.

A shortage of 150 million skilled laborers is anticipated in infrastructure development alone, resulting in scarcities of 33 million in the construction field, 26 million in the textile industry, 13 million in the health sector, and six million in education within India. Developing an excellent workforce necessitates an educated human resource. It’s crucial to acknowledge that, at a time when the focus should be on creating an educated and exceptional workforce, education in India is privatized. The education policy, with its emphasis on limited educational attainment, represents a regressive step restricting the human resource potential that grassroots communities could achieve through education.

The rationale behind the education policy is grounded in global economic calculations. The policy aims to provide skill-oriented education from the school level to create a skilled labour force. Twenty-five percent of schools in the country are directed towards producing this labour force by incorporating skill development into formal education. However, in the evolving landscape of global demography, having a youthful population alone will not suffice. Individuals lacking access to quality education cannot become valuable human resources equipped with the necessary skills. The National Education Policy 2020 progresses on a logic that overlooks this fundamental principle of fostering progress among people.

Rajesh Komath is an Associate Professor at the School of Social Sciences, Mahatma Gandhi University, Kottayam, Kerala

Lekshmi Prabha Snehalatha is an Assistant Professor of English at the General Department, Government Polytechnic College Adoor, Pathanamthitta, Kerala.

Bereft of Being: Body as a site of humiliation

JSS Guest Column — Mon, 09 Oct 2023 06:48:15 +0000

Rajesh Komath

Pravesh Shukla, the BJP loyalist from Sidhi in Madhya Pradesh, grabbed many a headline by his act of urinating on the head and face of an Adivasi sitting on the roadside. He symbolises the face of Hindutva that has continued to enjoy and exercise the privilege granted to him by birth, the Brahmin who has a deep-seated sense of superiority. And that explains this unabashed display of savarna power and right over a ‘subhuman’ who he identified on the wayside. The upper caste social psyche considers the inferior body as the substance of dirt that is produced from his body. It means Dalit, Adivasi’s body is equal to the dirt and filthy substance that his body produces.

What justice can one expect from a religion that has assigned different parts of the human form as the origin of each caste–the head for the Brahmin, the limbs to the Kshatriya, the abdomen to the Vaisya, and the feet to the Shudra? The Dalit-Adivasi emerged from the sole of the feet. They belong lower in the hierarchy to the animals. Perhaps, thus, justifying their having to be at the receiving end of the utmost deplorable treatment from the higher social groups. These were lives born out of Manu’s madness. Though not born from the head they are not mindless, nor powerless though not emerging from the limbs.

The obsession with caste that manifests in Manu’s thoughts is embedded in all religions within India. It is perpetuated in all walks of life. As one goes higher in the echelons of caste, it lends reverence, and as one descends this ladder discrimination and ignominy are integral elements. And the template of such a social structure is marked by intense hatred and cruelty.

A ‘Pravesh Shukla’ is the product of the conditioning and mindset which privileges him to use the body of the Adivasi as his domain to assert and establish the power equation between his self and the ‘Other’ human being at the receiving end.

The advantage of caste grants that innate ability to delude him into the insidious thinking that the hatred he nurtures in himself is correct and a rightful legacy of his birth. For us as onlookers, it is a criminal act. That is what Ambedkar identified caste as a criminal mind.

Seeing a vulnerable human being and slotting him as a thief from the detestable lower level of the caste grid is a consciousness built into what is at the core of the essence of Sanatan Dharma, which means that which remains unchanged, and eternal. For the Sanatani the subaltern who is lower in caste and colour is his subordinate. This, however, is not the problem of just one man but it is a canker afflicting Indian society. Many are the idealists who came forward to cure the system of metastasising growth. They failed or turned back. Drawing on the Constitutional guarantees and resorting to create a social revolution to change this mindset also has made no difference to this malaise. Deeply entrenched and with far-reaching striking power Manu’s ideas reign supreme.

While driving through the streets of North India, I have helplessly witnessed people driving four-wheelers walking up to the rickshaw puller, who would have abandoned his home in Bihar or Uttar Pradesh to come to the city to make a living, and giving a slap across the unsuspecting poor man’s face. His fault was that he did not make way for the vehicle of the entitled man. It is the might of the upper classes and the messaging over generations that has percolated to the Dalits and the Adivasis that make the rickshawallah remain sans any expression or reaction. This feature strikes any thinking person when watching the video, the powerless poor man who feels the urine on his face just cannot get himself to even shift from the spot because it is his lot to receive any ignominy. Shuklas like this celebrate the birth of a girl child in the Dalit-Adivasi hovel because it is one more site to satiate their lust—a fact that is constantly reinforced is the advantage of being born into a higher caste grants them such perquisites. In the given circumstances, how else can such individuals behave?

In India and the world over the largest number of people serving prison are dark-skinned humans. In the United States when policemen use water cannons on crowds the force of the water jet is stronger if the crowd is not white! In India being from the under-privileged population is a crime. An individual who belongs to the lowest strata of the social grouping in a population is vulnerable and fits the eligibility criteria when it comes to discriminatory, demeaning behavior being inflicted on him. The condition of women is pathetic. What is the attitude and approach that we can expect from the likes of Shukla when it comes to women and children?

Discrimination comes easily to us. We create parameters like ownership of land, colour, and wealth to segregate fellow beings. That is exactly what the concept of ‘taste of discrimination’ implies. Violence and aggression are justified behaviour. Over and above this, factors that enable the perpetration of discriminatory action are sought to be located in caste, and the colour of the skin becomes the signifier.

“I do not have a homeland.” “I was born a Hindu. But, never will die as Hindu”, Dr Ambedkar’s words are a pointer to the fact that Hinduism is a religion that is not amenable to change. And therefore, a ‘Pravesh Shukla’ does not regret his act because this BJP loyalist has only acted in a manner that privileges him above the Adivasi sitting by the roadside. He has not committed a heinous crime against the unsuspecting victim because his higher caste status birth grants him this license to behave in this deplorable manner. It is imperative to teach upper castes like him that they are oppressors and stop oppression. Our rule of law failed to do so. Amid the hue and cry of this incident, the Madhya Pradesh Chief minister washed the feet of the victim. One urinates on the head and another washed feet. Justice prevails outside of this body discourse. But Manu’s madness persists in our practices.

The author teaches social theory at the School of Social Sciences, Mahatma Gandhi University, Kottayam, Kerala

Unveiling Northeast India: A Region Explored from Within

KM SEETHI — Fri, 01 Sep 2023 06:24:00 +0000

Hoineilhing Sitlhou (ed.). 2023. Identity and Marginality in Northeast India: Challenges for Social Science Research. Hyderabad: Orient Black Swan, pp. 352.

Since May 2023, Manipur in Northeast India has been grappling with ethnic turmoil, resulting in nearly 200 casualties, widespread displacement, economic stagnation, and geopolitical setbacks. The unrest originated from clashes during a ‘tribal solidarity march’ organized by the All-Tribal Students’ Union, opposing the Meitei community’s bid to be classified as a Scheduled Tribe. The ST status would afford the predominantly Hindu Meitei people various benefits, but existing tribes, particularly the Kuki community, resist, fearing increased Meitei influence and land acquisition in Kuki-dominated areas. The conflict, if unaddressed, poses a risk of spreading to other parts of Northeast India. Mizoram has already witnessed the Meitei exodus due to escalating tensions, emphasizing the urgent need for intervention by central and state authorities to mitigate the crisis. Many states in Northeast India have similar tensions and conflicts.

In what ways is the Meitei-Kuki conflict in Manipur seen as a potential threat to other parts of Northeast India? What impact did the violence in Manipur have on other states in the region? How might the ongoing ethnic strife in Manipur impact the broader stability and geopolitical dynamics of Northeast India? Are there historical or cultural factors that could exacerbate such conflicts and potentially lead to similar tensions between other ethnic groups in the region? In the context of the larger Northeast region, how crucial is it for the authorities to balance the aspirations of different ethnic communities while maintaining overall peace and stability? Here, critical insights and perspectives from the region are very important.

Conceptualizing Northeast India as a unified and homogeneous region is a challenging task due to the complex interplay of ethnic, linguistic, cultural, and historical diversity among its population. The region is composed of eight states: Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Sikkim, and Tripura. In each state, a distinctive identity emerges from various traditions and historical experiences, collectively contributing to the region’s unique character. However, the region continues to grapple with various issues, including inter-ethnic conflicts, atrocities against women, insurgency, state violence, militarization, migration (both legal and illegal), and marginalization. The diverse challenges underscore the multifaceted nature of the region’s dynamics.

The volume under review originated from a national seminar held at the University of Hyderabad. The seminar, prompted by the turmoil in Nagaland surrounding the debate over a 33 per cent reservation for women in urban local bodies, highlighted the tension between the quota system and Naga customary laws protected by Article 371(A) of the Indian Constitution. The editor of the volume, Hoineilhing Sitlhou, rightly emphasizes the absence of coherent perspectives, frames, or models for studying Northeast India’s problems. She cites the complexity of understanding tribal societies, cautioning against approaching them through a narrow lens. Popular narratives, such as the glorified status of women in Manipur and the matrilineal structure of Khasi society, are deemed potentially misleading. Sitlhou argues that the conventional understanding of ‘social marginality’ often revolves around factors such as caste, class, race, ethnicity, and gender. She also introduces the concept of ‘spatial marginality,’ which refers to the physical or positional distance from centres of power, growth, and development. In acknowledging this multidimensional perspective, Sitlhou emphasizes that comprehending the issues of marginalization in the Northeast cannot be reduced to simplistic binary categories, such as colonizer and colonized or state and people. Sitlhou contends that these issues involve intricate layers of relations, some of which are more overtly oppositional than others. This complexity challenges the notion that the problems of marginalization in the Northeast can be neatly framed within straightforward dichotomies. Instead, Sitlhou suggests that understanding the complexity of social and spatial marginality requires a more nuanced and multifaceted approach that considers the various interrelated factors at play in the region.

The essays within the volume aim to engage the power dynamics at play in the Northeast, investigating the root causes of marginality. The overarching objective is to contribute to the reshaping of identity and the redefinition of marginality within the region. There are six sections in the volume. The first section ‘Politics of Difference and the Articulation of Identities’ has two essays. Sajal Nag analyses the dynamics of tribes in Northeast India, examining their experiences during both colonial and postcolonial periods. Nag traces the origins of the identity crises faced by various tribes in the region, which led to their transition from “self-confident and powerful tribes” to subdued subjects. According to Nag, these once-proud and valorous tribes entered the postcolonial era burdened with a sense of shame and embarrassment about their past. In their efforts to adapt to modernity, they underwent transformations marked by the adoption of modern education, a more civilized attire, and a new religion. This desperate attempt to meet the demands of modernity resulted in a loss of their traditional valour and bravery, Nag noted.

Papori Bora engages in a critical examination of knowledge production concerning India’s Northeast. Her analysis explores both colonial historical and ethnographic discourse shaping the region and the postcolonial interpretations of this discourse within the realm of social sciences. Bora contends that the Indian nationalist discourse tends to portray the Northeast as a region perpetually lagging behind the rest of India, both historically and in terms of modernity. This perception is not only upheld by the narrative of nationalist counter-insurgency but also finds resonance in the perspectives of social science disciplines like history and anthropology. These disciplines often approach the Northeast as an ‘other,’ viewing it through the lens of the Indian self. Bora’s scrutiny sheds light on the complexities of how knowledge about the Northeast has been constructed and perpetuated, emphasizing the need for a more careful and contextually aware approach.

The section ‘Colonialism and Northeast India’ has two essays. Malsawmdawngliana sketches the evolution of Mizo history, transitioning from an oral tradition to textualization during the colonial period. He underscores the multifaceted impact of colonial agencies on historical writing, explaining their influences and the inherent problems and inadequacies within their initiatives. According to Malsawmdawngliana, the process of incorporating the Mizos into the broader global context, or the ‘worlding’ of the Mizos, resulted in a subjectivity that mirrored Western agendas. Notably, the few instances of resistance were overlooked or omitted by colonial writers and historiographers. He contends that the present imperative is a reevaluation and rearticulation of the Mizo people’s position in history. This involves a shift towards narratives that allow the Mizos to tell their own stories, write their versions, employ their unique perspectives, and serve their specific purposes. Malsawmdawngliana advocates for a paradigm where the Mizo people actively participate in shaping and narrating their history, thereby reclaiming agency and autonomy in the construction of their historical identity.

Suryasikha Pathak undertakes an examination of early census practices and the subsequent debates surrounding them, particularly within the context of identity articulation. She notes that while census enumeration and its awareness introduced a certain rigidity in defining collective identities, paradoxically, it also contributed to rendering nationalist, ethnic, communal, and other identities more fluid. In Assam, Pathak highlights the complexity of the situation, where the diversity of communities, coupled with a remarkably fluid demographic structure, made it challenging to categorically delineate these communities. Pathak concludes that the process of census enumeration played a pivotal role in transforming the identity of plains tribes into a political reality. Simultaneously, it served as a battleground for contestation and the redefinition of identity, owing to the official legitimacy it bestowed upon various communities. Pathak also observes that the nexus between census practices and political rights played a crucial role in the emergence of communitarian politics during the 1930s and 1940s. The enumeration not only shaped the political landscape but also became a catalyst for communities to assert their identities within the political sphere, leading to a complex interplay between census data and the political dynamics of the time.

The essays within the section dedicated to ‘Race, Ethnicity, and Migration’ focus on the experiences of migrants from the Northeast living in Delhi. Hoineilhing Sitlhou and Salah Punathil specifically examine the discrimination and violence faced by migrants from the Northeastern region in Delhi in recent times. Their critical analysis revolves around the state’s response to the pervasive issues of biases and animosity as reflected in the Bezbaruah Committee of 2014. The authors scrutinize the reception and perception of the committee’s implementation among the migrant population in Delhi.

The authors present empirical data with the aim of contributing to the development of a fresh theoretical framework addressing race and violence in contemporary India. The escalating incidents of discrimination and violence against Northeasterners are put across as a consequence of portraying these people as racially and ethnically marginalized within the postcolonial Indian nation-state. They argue that the comprehensive implementation of the Bezbaruah Committee’s recommendations holds the potential to serve as a lasting remedy to the racial discrimination and violence faced by those from the Northeastern region.

Thanggoulen Kipgen explores the migration patterns of the Kuki community towards the nation’s capital, highlighting the compelling dynamics at play. Kipgen emphasizes that the interplay of poverty, unemployment, and socio-political instability acts as a driving force, prompting educated youth in Manipur to venture beyond their native state. Larger cities, with their diverse job landscapes and promises of an enhanced lifestyle, emerge as irresistible attractions for these people seeking broader horizons. According to Kipgen, in the face of manifold discrimination and marginalization encountered by the Kukis and other Northern migrants, the city of Delhi remains remarkably resilient as one of their preferred destinations. This suggests that, despite the challenges, Delhi continues to symbolize a mainstay of opportunity and the potential for a brighter future.

The section addressing ‘Negotiating Gender, Culture, and Identity’ has three essays, all exploring gender dynamics within the context of Mizoram and Manipur. Lalhmingmawii underscores that unlike in other regions of India where LGBT movements have spurred legal recognition of alternative sexualities, the liberation of the LGBT community in Mizoram faces constraints from civil society groups like the Young Mizo Association and certain women’s organizations. Lalhmingmawii contends that the pervasive influence of Christianity in Mizo society results in the stigmatization of non-normative sexuality, branding it as deviant. While strides towards inclusivity are evident elsewhere in India, LGBTQ activists in Mizoram yearn for a future where community members can openly embrace their identity beneath the rainbow flag.

Shifting focus to Manipur, Ruth Nengneilhing examines the plight of women displaced during the Kuki-Naga clash of the 1990s. Investigating into the experiences of resettlement colonies, Nengneilhing reveals the profound impact of an inequitable system and skewed resource distribution on Kuki women. The Kuki-Naga conflict triggered extensive displacement, encompassing both spontaneous fleeing from life-threatening situations and organized, planned population transfers involving human rights abuses. Nengneilhing delineates the divergent effects of armed conflicts on men and women, drawing attention to distinct vulnerabilities arising from societal roles and uneven access to resources. The study calls for a more gender-sensitive approach to comprehending the challenges faced by conflict-affected populations and addressing their complex issues.

V. Sawmveli unfolds the impact of Protestant Christianity on the perpetuation of traditional gender dynamics and inequality within Mizo society. Her study, conducted across three towns in the state, sheds light on the persistent gender disparities evident within the Presbyterian Church of Mizoram, Baptist Church of Mizoram, and Evangelical Church of Maraland. Despite Mizo women generally experiencing a degree of autonomy in specific facets of their lives, Sawmveli shows how these religious institutions contribute to the persistence of gender inequality. It highlights the complex interaction between traditional cultural norms, religious influences, and the varying degrees of empowerment experienced by Mizo women within the context of their faith.

Within the section addressing ‘Indigeneity, Land, and Identity,’ two essays offer distinctive insights. Venusa Tinyi contributes an ethnographic exploration of the Chakhesang Nagas, contending that colonial narratives often lack consistency, making it challenging to glean a holistic and comprehensive understanding from them. As a native insider, Tinyi challenges the tendency to categorize every practice and custom of the community as mere myths. Instead, he advocates for a careful approach that seeks to bring out the socio-cultural values and beliefs underpinning the practices of the Nagas, aiming for a more profound understanding beyond superficial interpretations.

Rekha M. Shangpliang investigates the crucial role played by women in natural resource management, with a specific emphasis on the forest rights of the rural Khasi community. Shangpliang highlights the state’s efforts to assert greater control over the region’s forests through the implementation of new laws and regulations. In doing so, she underscores how these measures often disregard the longstanding traditional rights of the Khasi community concerning their land and forests. Shangpliang’s exploration sheds light on the complex interplay between evolving governmental policies and the indigenous community’s established practices, emphasizing the need to acknowledge and preserve the unique socio-cultural fabric of the Khasi people.

In the final section, the thematic focus centres on ‘Borders, States, and Markets.’ N. William Singh provides an in-depth examination of the collective consciousness within marginalized communities and the intricate politics of marginalization that disavow the very individuals constituting a civic order. He focussed the roles played by media and civil society in the current flux of migrants. Singh also inquired into the marginalization experienced by Chin migrants in Mizoram, elucidating the reasons behind their peripheral status and the unfortunate reality of their voices remaining unheard.

Lalhmangaihi Chhakchhuak explores the transformative shifts in the social and economic fabric of Mizo society over recent decades, resulting in the emergence of new relations and networks. Through a political economy lens, Chhakchhuak scrutinizes the new hazards and challenges to social life, including the prevalence of fatal illnesses that have impacted the population in Mizoram. She contends that the risks accompanying economic development and modernization are frequently overlooked, emphasizing the need for a comprehensive understanding of the implications of societal transformations.

In sum, the essays comprising this volume strive to construct a sociological inquiry into a range of issues impacting Northeast India. By incorporating diverse writings from various social science disciplines, the collection underlines the imperative for a comprehensive, interdisciplinary, and nationally oriented discourse. This approach is deemed crucial for identifying and implementing solutions to the enduring challenges faced by Northeast India. The compilation serves as evidence of the significance of collaborative and expansive dialogue in addressing the complex socio-cultural landscape of the region.

The authors perceptively analysed the complex social history of the region, contesting simplistic narratives that portray it as a monolithic entity. They have brought out the diverse experiences of ethnic communities, their engagements, conflicts, and contestations. The volume is not only a rich academic contribution to postcolonial studies but also a captivating repertoire for anyone interested in the multifaceted social life of the historically overlooked Northeast India.

For full text Read State and Society 2023 -KM Seethi

Elementor #1299

km seethi — Mon, 24 Jul 2023 05:43:18 +0000

World Hunger and the War in Ukraine

JSS Guest Column — Fri, 21 Jul 2023 03:16:36 +0000

VIJAY PRASHAD

Tags: Opinion, Politics, Africa, Time-Sensitive, News, Community, Trade, Europe/Russia, Europe/Ukraine, Food, United Nations, Europe

On Monday, June 17, Dmitry Peskov, the spokesperson for Russia’s President Vladimir Putin, announced, “The Black Sea agreements are no longer in effect.” This was a blunt statement to suspend the Black Sea Grain Initiative that emerged out of intense negotiations in the hours after Russian forces entered Ukraine in February 2022. The Initiative went into effect on July 22, 2022, after Russian and Ukrainian officials signed it in Istanbul in the presence of the United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres and Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

Guterres called the Initiative a “beacon of hope” for two reasons. First, it is remarkable to have an agreement of this kind between belligerents in an ongoing war. Second, Russia and Ukraine are major producers of wheat, barley, maize, rapeseed and rapeseed oil, sunflower seeds and sunflower oil, as well as nitrogen, potassic, and phosphorus fertilizer, accounting for twelve percent of calories traded. Disruption of supply from Russia and Ukraine, it was felt by a range of international organizations, would have a catastrophic impact on world food markets and on hunger. As Western—largely U.S., UK, and European—sanctions increased against Russia, the feasibility of the deal began to diminish. It was suspended several times during the past year. In March 2023, Russia’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova responding to the sanctions against Russian agriculture, said, “[The main] parameters provided for in the [grain] deal do not work.”

Financialization Leads to Hunger

U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that his country regrets Russia’s “continued weaponization of food” since this “harms millions of vulnerable people around the world.” Indeed, the timing of the suspension could not be worse. A United Nations report, “The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2023” (July 12, 2023), shows that one in ten people in the world struggles with hunger and that 3.1 billion people cannot afford a healthy diet. But the report itself makes an interesting point: that the war in Ukraine has driven 23 million people into hunger, a number that pales in comparison to the other drivers of hunger—such as the impact of commercialized food markets and the COVID-19 pandemic. A 2011 report from World Development Movement called “Broken Markets: How Financial Market Regulation Can Help Prevent Another Global Food Crisis” showed that “financial speculators now dominate the [food] market, holding over 60 percent of some markets compared to 12 percent 15 years ago.”

The situation has since worsened. Dr. Sophie van Huellen, who studies financial speculation in food markets, pointed out in late 2022 that while there are indeed food shortages, “the current food crisis is a price crisis, rather than a supply crisis.” The end of the Black Sea Grain Initiative is indeed regrettable, but it is not the leading cause of hunger in the world. The leading cause—as even the European Economic and Social Committee agrees—is financial speculation in food markets.

Why Did Russia Suspend the Initiative?

To monitor the Black Sea Grain Initiative, the United Nations set up a Joint Coordination Centre (JCC) in Istanbul. It is staffed by representatives from Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, and the United Nations. On several occasions, the JCC had to deal with tensions between Russia and Ukraine over the shipments, such as when Ukraine attacked Russia’s Black Sea Fleet—some of whose vessels carried the grain—in Sevastopol, Crimea, in October 2022. Tensions remained over the initiative as Western sanctions against Russia tightened, making it difficult for Russia to export its own agricultural products into the world market.

Russia put three requirements on the table to the United Nations regarding its own agricultural system. First, the Russian government asked that the Russian Agricultural Bank—the premier credit and trade bank for Russian agriculture—be reconnected to the SWIFT system, from which it had been cut off by the European Union’s sixth package of sanctions in June 2022. A Turkish banker told TASS that there is the possibility that the European Union could “issue a general license to the Russian Agricultural Bank” and that the Bank “has the opportunity to use JP Morgan to conduct transactions in U.S. dollars” as long as the exporters being paid for were part of the Black Sea Grain Initiative.

Second, from the first discussions about the Grain Initiative, Moscow put on the table its export of ammonia fertilizer from Russia both through the port of Odesa and of supplies held in Latvia and the Netherlands. A central part of the debate has been the reopening of the Togliatti-Odesa pipeline, the world’s longest ammonia pipeline. In July 2022, the UN and Russia signed an agreement that would facilitate the sale of Russian ammonia on the world market. The UN’s Guterres went to the Security Council to announce, “We are doing everything possible to… ease the serious fertilizer market crunch that is already affecting farming in West Africa and elsewhere. If the fertilizer market is not stabilized, next year could bring a food supply crisis. Simply put, the world may run out of food.” On June 8, 2023, Ukrainian forces blew up a section of the Togliatti-Odesa pipeline in Kharkiv, increasing the tension over this dispute. Other than the Black Sea ports, Russia has no other safe way to export its ammonia-based fertilizers.

Third, Russia’s agricultural sector faces challenges from a lack of ability to import machinery and spare parts, and Russian ships are not able to buy insurance or enter many foreign ports. Despite the “carve-outs” in Western sanctions for agriculture, sanctions on firms and individuals have debilitated Russia’s agricultural sector.

To counter Western sanctions, Russia placed restrictions on the export of fertilizer and agricultural products. These restrictions included the ban on the export of certain goods (such as temporary bans of wheat exports to the Eurasian Economic Union), the increase of licensing requirements (including for compound fertilizers, requirements set in place before the war), and the increase of export taxes. These Russian moves come alongside strategic direct sales to countries, such as India, which will re-export to other countries.

In late July, St. Petersburg will host the Second Russia-Africa Economic and Humanitarian Forum, where these topics will surely be front and center. Ahead of the summit, President Putin called South Africa’s Cyril Ramaphosa to inform him about the problems faced by Russia in exporting its food and fertilizers to the African continent. “The deal’s main goal,” he said of the Black Sea Grain Initiative, was “to supply grain to countries in need, including those on the African continent, has not been implemented.”

It is likely that the Black Sea Grain Initiative will restart within the month. Earlier suspensions have not lasted longer than a few weeks. But this time, it is not clear if the West will give Russia any relief on its ability to export its own agricultural products. Certainly, the suspension will impact millions of people around the world who struggle with endemic hunger. Billions of others who are hungry because of financial speculation in food markets are not impacted directly by these developments.

Vijay Prashad is an Indian historian, editor, and journalist. He is a writing fellow and chief correspondent at Globetrotter. He is an editor of LeftWord Books and the director of Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research. He has written more than 20 books, including The Darker Nations and The Poorer Nations. His latest books are Struggle Makes Us Human: Learning from Movements for Socialism and (with Noam Chomsky) The Withdrawal: Iraq, Libya, Afghanistan, and the Fragility of U.S. Power.

Courtesy: Globetrotter